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I. INTRODUCTION

There is now a small but growing literature on the proper
voting procedure for multijudge panels. Professor John Rogers began
the most recent round of thinking about these vexing issues, arguing
that a judge on a multimember panel should never "vote against the
result of his or her own reasoning by deferring to a majority on a subissue on which the judge differs."1 We responded, arguing in favor of
just such action, which we labeled "issue voting."2 We criticized
Professor Rogers's preferred mode of multimember court adjudication,
which we labeled "outcome voting," on the grounds that it provided
limited guidance and inevitably produced path dependence and
incoherence in the law. Professors Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence
Sager presented a third position that "no simple rule favoring one
voting protocol in all paradoxical cases can produce universally

*

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Co-

Director, Cyberspace Law Institute.

**
Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1.
John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong:" The Supreme Court Justice as
Epinenides,79 Ky. L. J. 439 (1991).
2.
David Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by
Multijudge Panels, 80 Georgetown L. J. 743 (1992).
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appealing results."3 They set forth a mechanism, which they called
the "metavote procedure," by which courts would resolve the question
4
of which of these two voting rules to adopt in any particular case.
Professor Maxwell Stearns also has examined these issues in detail,
from a social choice perspective. 5 Rogers now joins the fray once
again, calling for blanket adoption of outcome voting for multimember
courts, finding our arguments (and Kornhauser and Sager's)
6
unpersuasive on a number of grounds.
Professor Rogers's critique makes it clear that we did not deal
with these questions definitively in our earlier paper. We are still unpersuaded, however, that his solution is the better one. In this brief
Reply, we will sketch out a partial answer to Rogers's concerns.
II. THE GUIDANCE OBJECTION TO OUTCOME VOTING

In our view, the fundamental flaw of outcome voting is that it
produces precedent that is both less useful and may be incapable of
coherent application. Outcome voting provides substantially less
guidance about the content of legal rules than an alternative, issuevoting system. We refer to this constellation of problems with
outcome voting as the "Guidance Objection." Our point can be
illustrated simply using Rogers's own example. 7 Three criminal
defendants (Q, R, and S) are alleged to have committed identical
crimes, and all three were convicted. In R's case, evidence from the
police's use of a questionable search technique was introduced. At S's
trial, the trial court allowed use of a questionable peremptory

Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
3.
Collegial Courts, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1993).
Professors Kornhauser and Sager describe the metavote procedure as follows. In a
4.
"paradoxicar' case, that is, one in which the outcome will differ depending upon whether
outcome voting or issue voting is employed, a court ought to make the question of which
procedure to adopt and its resolution an
explicit, reflective, articulated, and formal part of its decision of the case. The judges
should deliberate about the appropriate collegial action to take in the case before them,
given their convictions about all those matters that they would be called on to determine
were they deciding the case as individuals rather than as a group. They should vote on
the question of collegial action as they would any other question, and they should proffer
an opinion or several opinions justifying their metavote.
Id. at 30.
5.
See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissanceof Social Choice, 103 Yale L. J.
1219 (1994); Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 Cal. L. Rev.
1309 (1995); Standing and Social Choice: HistoricalEvidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309 (1995).
See generally John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A
6.
Response to Some Radical Proposals,49 Vand. L. Rev. 997, 1007-21 (1996).
7.
See id. at 1012-13.
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challenge. In Q's case, both the questionable search technique and
the questionable peremptory challenge were employed.
Imagine a three-member appellate panel which has
provisionally adopted Rogers's outcome-voting rule and which is
reviewing Q's conviction. 8 The conversation at the judges' conference
might proceed as follows.
Judge ABC: "I vote to affirm. Neither the peremptory challenge nor the

search technique is unconstitutional, standing alone, and I see no reason that
their use in combination with one another is constitutionally flawed."
Judge DEF: "I disagree. The peremptory challenge alone is clearly unconstitutional. In fact, I didn't even have to reach the question of the search
technique in order to resolve the question presented here, namely whether this
defendant was unconstitutionally convicted. I vote to reverse."
Judge GFH: "I also disagree with Judge ABC. The search technique
alone is clearly unconstitutional. In fact, I didn't even have to reach the
question of the peremptory challenge in order to resolve the question presented
here, namely whether this defendant was unconstitutionally convicted. I vote
to reverse."

We can summarize the conference and the votes on Q's case in the
following example.
Example 1.
Search Technique
Judge

Peremptorv Challenge

ABC
DEF
GHI

---.

Constitutional
Unconstitutional

Unconstitutional

-.--

Majority

---(1-1)

Constitutional

---(1-1)

Result of Individual
Judge's Reasoning
Affirm
Reverse
Reverse
Reverse (2-1)

Under an outcome-voting procedure, the court issues its judgment, overturning the conviction by a two-to-one majority vote.
Because there is only one question of law on which the judges vote,
that is, whether a conviction obtained by means involving both the

8. We have reduced Rogers's nine-person court to a three-person court, just for
expositional simplicity. Inasmuch as Rogers's hypothetical collection of judges consisted of three
identically acting trios-judges A, B, and C forming one trio; judges D, E, and F the second; and
judges G, H, and I the third-we can collapse this collection into three judges (whom we will call
ABC, DEF, and GHI)without any loss of information.
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questionable search technique and the questionable peremptory challenge is invalid, only one rule-that these means in combination are
invalid-emerges from the court's deliberations. 9 Because outcome
voting allows Judges DEF and GHI to ignore issues that are unnecessary to their individual reasoning about the case, the court does not
indicate whether the search technique would be constitutional if it
were employed without its fortuitous association with the peremptory
challenge, or whether the peremptory challenge would be
constitutional without its fortuitous association with the search
technique. On each of these issues, the court apparently is equally
divided, one-to-one. Thus, the panel provides no guidance for R's and
S's cases.
In our earlier paper, we focused on what Professor Kornhauser
and Sager call the "paradoxical" result that may occur under an
outcome-voting regime. 10 The paradox occurs if, but only if, the judges
reveal their views on each of the underlying issues presented by the
case and their views take a particular form, as illustrated by the
following example.
Example 1A.
Judge
Search Technique

Peremptorv Challenge

ABC
DEF
GFH

Constitutional
Constitutional
Unconstitutional

Constitutional
Unconstitutional
Constitutional

Result of Individual
Judge's Reasoning
Affirm
Reverse
Reverse

Majority

Constitutional (2-1)

Constitutional (2-1)

Reverse (2-1)

In this situation, one majority of this court believes that the
search technique is constitutional, and a different majority believes
that the use of the peremptory challenge is constitutional.
Nonetheless, under outcome voting, the conviction of defendant Q will
be reversed, while the convictions of R and S will stand.
In Example 1, the paradox is not revealed. Because the judges
need only declare their views on the issues that are dispositive for
their own individual reasoning about the sole question on which they
have to vote, the public will not know (nor will the judges themselves
know) whether or not the paradoxical situation pertains.
This
absence of revelation, we would suggest, is why the paradox appears
so infrequently in the law. Appellate judges can so easily avoid
9.

See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1013 (cited in note 6).

10.

See note 4.
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revealing the paradoxical result, and can so easily avoid even finding
out whether the paradox exists in any given case, by declining to
reach issues unnecessary to their individual reasoning process.
But the revelation of the paradoxical result is not essential to
our analysis. The Guidance Objection flows directly from concerns involving application of the principle of stare decisis. Suppose that the
court in Example 1 agreed to follow the principle of stare decisis in its
deliberations. Inasmuch as it has taken a position only on the outcome of the case, a future court, to be faithful to the principle of stare
decisis, need only ensure that the same outcome obtains if and when a
case raising this particular combination of search technique and peremptory challenge comes before the tribunal again. The principle of
stare decisis can only mean that the conviction of another defendant
subject to both of these constitutional shortcomings must be overturned. Because the court in Example 1 is silent about the consequences of employing this search technique against a defendant who
has not had the peremptory challenge used against him as well, stare
decisis will not be implicated when such a defendant comes before the
tribunal. There will be no precedent to apply in such a case, for nothing has been decided on that question of law. In other words, an outcome-voting regime can easily accommodate only one form of stare decisis, what Hardisty calls "result stare decisis." "Under result stare
decisis, a court adheres to an otherwise binding precedent... as long
as similarity in results follows similarity in facts and a difference in
results reflects a difference in facts.""
How would the court in Example 1 articulate its reasoning in
its opinions to guide the public about the governing rules in this
jurisdiction? The court has issued a single rule of law in this case:
the conviction of a defendant subject to both the search and the
peremptory challenge must be overturned. But no opinion can be
written articulating that rule without also articulating a rule the
court is not prepared to issue (in other words, that the presence of any
one of the challenged techniques is unconstitutional). That is, there
can be no statement from the court explaining why a conviction
depending on both of these challenged techniques should be
overturned while a conviction depending on only one of them should
not. This is because there is no judge who has reached that particular
conclusion. As a result, there is both (a) no guidance at all with

11.

James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 Ind. L. J. 41, 56 (1979).
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respect to the subsidiary questions, such as the constitutionality of
the peremptory challenge standing alone or when paired with a
different question of law, or the constitutionality of the search
technique standing alone or when paired with a different question of
law, and (b) virtually no guidance concerning even the single rule that
12
the case ostensibly establishes.

III. THE INDETERMINACY OBJECTION TO ISSUE VOTING
Professor Rogers seems to agree with much of our diagnosis of
the flaws of outcome voting. For example, he agrees that outcome
voting can lead to "incoherence" in the law. 3 He similarly agrees that
outcome voting may lead to path dependence, inasmuch as Q's case
will be decided differently if it comes before or after the court has
decided R and S. 14 He claims, however, that the issue-voting cure is
worse than the outcome-voting disease. 15 There are, he suggests,
"overwhelming reasons for not turning to a system of issue voting."16
These most notably include what Rogers regards as a fundamental
problem inherent in any issue-voting system. According to Rogers,
the definition of the issues on which appellate courts should be voting
is "radically indeterminate." 17 "Issue voting is a bad solution," he
argues, "because it would be so much more indeterminate than the
outcome-voting system.... There is no developed body of law on how
issues must be divided for separate voting. In order to approach
12. The Guidance Objection is closely related to similar objections lodged against strict
application of result stare decisis. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts:
Crisis and Reform 253 (Harv. U., 1985) C'[I]f one... insists that a judicial opinion is
authoritative only with respect to the exact constellation of facts that was before the judges who
decided the case, the decision will have no utility as a precedent, because no two cases have
exactly the same facts.... [Tihis is one reason why judicial opinions contain analysis and not
just a statement of facts followed by announcement of the result; the analysis shows which facts
are essential to the decision").
13. Rogers refers to the paradoxical result as an "incoherent result [in] that both errors
combined result[ ] in reversal, even though it had previously been held that neither of the errors
alone would invalidate the conviction." Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1016 (cited in note 6). See
also id. at 1017 (referring again to this as an "incoherent result").
14. See id. at 1015 (stating that Q's case "will have different results depending upon
whether it reaches the appellate court before or after either the R or S case. Thus the result in
Q is path dependent").
15. See id. at 1001.
16. Id. at 1025.
17. See id. at 1021 (noting the "potential for radical indeterminacy" in an issue voting
system); id. at 1038 ('Advocates of issue voting may assume agreement on how issues should be
divided, but the assumption is completely unwarranted. Issues in cases can be divided in
different ways to achieve different results"); id. at 1002-04 (discussing the various ways that one
can "state the relevant subissues" in Tidewater).
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consistency in the law, there would have to be a whole body of law
8
developed on the question of dividing issues on appeal."'
We refer to Rogers's position as the "Indeterminacy Objection."
The Indeterminacy Objection is a serious one, and we concede that it
is both more complex and more interesting than we indicated in our
earlier paper. Rogers's critique makes it clear that we focused
exclusively on the costs of outcome voting, and gave scant attention to
the possibility that issue voting entails costs of its own or to the possibility that these costs may exceed the costs of outcome voting. At the
same time, although we agree with Rogers that there are costs entailed by adopting issue voting, we are not persuaded that those costs
are as substantial or as unavoidable as Rogers assumes.
To see this more clearly, the Indeterminacy Objection can be
restated. If courts are to vote on issues, there must be some
mechanism whereby those issues can be identified prior to the vote.
As Rogers points out, specification of issues is neither preordained nor
Presented with the specification of the two issues in
obvious.
Example 1, a court could go "one level down" and decompose 19 either
one or both of the issues into subissues. For example, the defendant
may be claiming that the search was unconstitutional because he was
unlawfully detained without probable cause and that any purported
consent to the search was not voluntarily given.20 And each of those
subissues may, in turn, be further decomposed, apparently ad
infinitum.
Rogers suggests that there is no principle that can guide this
issue decomposition process. Were that the case, issue voting would
indeed be deeply and perhaps fatally flawed because any outcome
could be achieved under issue voting by manipulating the degree of
issue decomposition. This openendedness, in turn, would allow great
scope to a form of agenda control that we term "issue decomposition
manipulation."
Judges could attempt to obtain their preferred
outcome by manipulating the level of issue decomposition.21
18.

Id. at 1014.

19. We prefer to speak of "decomposing" rather than "dividing" issues when discussing the
separation of an individual issue into constituent subissues in order to emphasize that we are
moving, at least metaphorically, "down" an issue hierarchy in a vertical manner. As discussed
below, see notes 35-36 and accompanying text, different considerations may come into play
when moving "horizontally" across different issue formulations.
20. See, for example, United States v. Mendenhall,446 U.S. 544, 547-50 (1980).
21. And, needless to say, the attorneys arguing the case could try to manipulate the
formulation of the issues as a way of influencing the judges to adopt their preferred issue
formulation.
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For example, suppose that a panel votes on the search issue
and the votes of the three judges are arrayed below in Example 2A.
Example 2A.
udze

Search Technique

X
Y
Z
Majority

Unconstitutional
Constitutional
Unconstitutional
Unconstitutional (2-1)

On this formulation of the issue, by a two-to-one majority the court
apparently favors a holding that the search is unconstitutional. If,
however, the search issue is decomposed into two subissues, the
judges' preferences may lead to a different result, as summarized in
Example 2B.
Example 2B.
Lugd=
Voluntariness

Lawfulness of Initial Stop

Result of Individual
Judge's Reason'n_

(seEx2A)
X
Y
Z

Unconstitutional
Constitutional
Constitutional

Constitutional
Constitutional
Unconstitutional

Unconstitutional
Constitutional
Unconstitutional

Majority

Constitutional

Constitutional

Unconstitutional

Thus, by decomposing the search issue into its component subissues
and voting on these subissues, the holding has been transformed into
22
a holding that the search technique is constitutional.
Rogers would solve the Indeterminacy Objection by forbidding
any decomposition of issues whatsoever. To Rogers, the only relevant
question of law presented by any case is the one at the highest level of
the issue hierarchy, which is obtained by combining all possible subissues into a single vote on the outcome itself. That is, just as it
appears to be always possible to decompose issues into subissues, one
22. See Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue
Identification. A Reply to ProfessorJohn Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1045, 1063 (1996)

(noting that under issue voting "the determination of issues and issue levels would determine
the outcome of the case. As a result, to avoid the outcome on a given issue, subissues, or subsubissues, and so on, justices will have a strong incentive to continue going down levels until a
path emerges [ ] that gets to where they want to go...").

1996]
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can also move in the opposite direction, to go "one level up" from any
specification of issues. The two subissues in Example 2B can be
combined into the single issue set forth in Example 2A.
The two issues that we began with in Example 1-the
constitutionality of the search technique and the constitutionality of
the peremptory challenge-can likewise be combined into a single
issue: whether the combination of the search and the peremptory
At this highest level of the issue
challenge is constitutional.
hierarchy, the single issue presented is what we have referred to as
the outcome.2 3 Thus, it becomes clear that outcome voting can be
viewed as simply a special case of issue voting in which a particular
issue decomposition rule is employed. Under outcome voting, courts
a
are directed to vote only on the single issue presented by the case as
24
whole, that is, the issue at the highest level of the issue hierarchy.
IV. RESOLVING THE INDETERMINACY OBJECTION TO ISSUE VOTING
The outcome-voting solution to the Indeterminacy Objection,
requiring adoption of a particular issue decomposition rule, has an obvious virtue: it provides a unique issue formulation in every case,
The Guidance
thereby avoiding issue manipulation problems.
Objection, however, remains. If outcome voting is the only way to
meet the Indeterminacy Objection, some courts might agree with
Rogers that the need for determinacy dominates the need for guidance. We think, however, that there may be other issue formulation
rules that are capable of determining a unique set of relevant issues,
so that the agenda manipulation costs of issue voting can be

23. Rogers's listing of the "issues" on which the justices disagreed in Tidewater includes as
issue A the "outcome" in that case: "Is a statute giving federal court jurisdiction over
controversies between D.C. citizens and citizens of a state within the constitutional power of
Congress?' Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Roy. at 1002 (cited in note 6). Rogers himself calls this the
"overall issue" that emerges if the court "in effect... refuses to divide issues at all." Id. at 1004.
See also Stearns, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1058-59 (cited in note 22) (noting that Rogers "mix[es]
issue and outcome voting.., in his analysis of Tidewater... [by presenting] two alternatives,
issue A, which is a direct vote on the outcome, or issues B plus C, which together create an
opposite outcome").
24. The paradoxical result under outcome voting, see text accompanying note 10, is thus
just a special case of the more general phenomenon discussed in the text. Just as voting on the
single "issue" at the highest level of the issue hierarchy-that is, outcome voting-can yield a
different result if one breaks that issue into its component subissues and votes separately on
each of those, so too can the result of the vote on any subissue change if one takes votes on each
of its components, and so on further down the issue hierarchy.
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minimized even while providing the superior guidance of an issuevoting regime.
To meet the Indeterminacy Objection we propose the following
issue decomposition rule:
A primary issue on which multimember courts should vote is a question of law
presented by a case that (a) is logically independent of any other questions presented by the case, in the sense that the question can be resolved as a logical
matter without reference to any other accompanying questions, (b) is
potentially dispositive of the outcome of the case, in the sense that resolution
of the question can uniquely determine the outcome of the case, and (c) cannot
be further decomposed into separate subquestions that fulfill criteria (a) and

(b).
This rule is derived by a kind of backward induction from the
principle of stare decisis itself, precisely because our goal is to maximize the amount of future guidance that courts can provide in any
given case through the application of stare decisis. The stare decisis
we have in mind, however, is "rule stare decisis," not the "result stare
decisis" that is applied under outcome voting:
Jurists commonly embrace "rule stare decisis" by explicitly or implicitly
assuming that "decisis" denotes judicial decisions to adopt certain rules.
[A]ppellate courts commonly apply rules to facts to justify their
judgments. Under rule stare decisis, a court follows stare decisis when it
adheres to these rules of law expressly stated in "binding" precedents.
Appellate courts articulate rules of law for the same reasons they follow
the principle of stare decisis. The reasons of guidance, predictability,
efficiency, uniformity and impersonality, which explain why courts articulate
rules of law in the first place, also explain why courts adhere to those rules in
later cases.... The courts, having articulated the rules in order to increase
efficiency, uniformity and impersonality, must generally follow the rules in
order to achieve these values. Moreover they must appear to follow the rules
in order to appear to achieve these values. Thus, the same factors that explain
why a court applies rules to facts to justify its judgment also partially explain
why precedential justifying rules are among the referents of decisis in stare
25
decisis.

Under rule stare decisis, the output of courts is composed primarily of "precedential rules of law labeled 'holdings' (or 'rationes decidendi')."26 These are rules of law that are applied to the particular
constellation of facts in a case and necessary to the outcome that the

25.

Hardisty, 55 Ind. L. J. at 53-55 (cited in note 11) (footnotes omitted).

26.

Id. at 57-58.
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court reached. These rules can be extracted and applied in later cases
that present different aggregate constellations of facts and legal questions. The first two components of our issue decomposition rule
assure that a "primary issue" will be a question of law on which the
court can issue such a "holding." The requirement that a primary
issue must be logically independent of all other questions with which
it is associated ensures that the court's resolution of the primary issue
can be applied in future situations where those associated questions
do not appear. The requirement that a primary issue must be
potentially dispositive assures that it is "necessary" that the court
resolves the issue one way or another. In other words, the outcome in
the case would be different if the primary issue were resolved
differently.
For example, the two issues in Example 1-the constitutionality of the search and the constitutionality of the peremptory challenge-satisfy these first two criteria. Either of these issues is, as a
matter of substantive constitutional law, capable of disposing of the
case. In addition, each can be disposed of without reference to the
27
other.
Each of these issues, however, may be further decomposable.
The third criterion of our issue decomposition rule provides a
"stopping rule" for this process that should produce a unique
statement of the issues in a given case by directing courts to continue
the issue decomposition process only as long as the subissues
identified are (a) logically independent of one another, and (b)
potentially dispositive of the case. To illustrate, the issue of the
constitutionality of the search technique identified in Example 2A is
not a "primary issue" within our definition because it can be decomposed into independent questions of law that fulfill the first two criteria, as shown in Example 2B.28
27. See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1013 (cited in note 6), where Rogers points out that
there is "no logical relation" between these two questions. Similarly, most if not all ordinary
civil cases, such as a suit for breach of contract, will present at least three issues that are
logically independent and capable of disposing of the case at hand: (1) whether the court can
exercise subject matter jurisdiction generally over breach of contract actions, (2) whether the
court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and (3) whether the plaintiff has
carried his burden of proof on the merits.
28. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557 (dividing the case into the questions of whether the
"search of [the defendants] person was ... preceded by an impermissible seizure" and whether
the defendants consent to the search was "for any other reason invalid"). Similarly, the single
question at the highest level of the issue hierarchy in Tidewater (what Rogers lists as issue A in
his list of "Issues on which justices disagreed in Tidewater," see Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at
1002 (cited in note 6)) can be divided into two issues fulfilling the first two criteria of our issue
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Continuing the decomposition process is unlikely to yield
additional primary issues, however. The question, for example, of
whether the defendant's consent to the search was voluntary requires
consideration of a number of different factors: whether the police
officer informed the defendant that he had the opportunity to
withhold his consent, whether or not there was a show of force, the
conversation that transpired immediately prior to the demonstration
of consent, the defendant's mental state and capacity, etc. But, as a
matter of substantive law, none of these factors can be dispositive of
the question of voluntariness of consent, because that question turns
on the reviewing court's evaluation of the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding the consent.29 By definition, there can be
no dispositive subsidiary question of the form "whether the police officer's failure to inform the defendant of the opportunity to withhold
consent renders consent involuntarily obtained" because that would
necessarily mean that only one "circumstance"-the presence or absence of that failure on the officer's part-need be considered in determining voluntariness. This is logically inconsistent with the rule
30
that the totality of all of the circumstances must be considered.
Accordingly, the issue decomposition process stops at this third level
of the issue hierarchy.31
decomposition rule: (1) whether a citizen of the District of Columbia is a citizen of an Article III
"State" (issue B), and (2) whether Congress can constitutionally confer jurisdiction of federal
courts under Article I beyond the limits ofArticle III (issue C).
29. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544 (stating whether consent to search is "the product of
duress or coercion... is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances"); id.
(concluding that seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred only if, "in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave").
30. In other words, a rule that courts must consider the "totality of the circumstances" in
determining whether the consent was voluntary necessarily implies that no dispositive rule of
the form "If X, then the consent was/was not voluntary" can exist at subsidiary levels of the
issue hierarchy. The idea that there can be no dispositive subissues in a totality of the
circumstances inquiry is widely recognized. See, for example, Allen v. City of Portland,73 F.3d
232, 233 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining whether confinement was coercive is a "totality of the
circumstances" inquiry in which "[n]o one factor is dispositive"); United States v. Milbrand, 58
F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1995) (determining whether forfeiture can be sustained against an eighth
amendment challenge is a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry in which "[n]o one... factor[]
is dispositive").
31. It similarly appears that the decomposition process in Tidewater can stop after the
second level of the issue hierarchy. Except for what Rogers labels issue A (the highest-level
specification and what we call the outcome) and issues B and C (the first-order decomposition),
none of the separate questions set forth in Rogers's list of 'Issues on which justices disagreed in
Tidewater"' appear to be capable, standing alone, of disposing of the overall question whether
the statute before the Court is constitutional. For example, whatever a justice's view of whether
the Constitution should be given a strict or broad interpretation (issue D), disposition of the case
also requires determination of whether a broad (or strict) interpretation permits Congress to
enact the statute in question (issue E). Similarly, whatever a justice's view of whether the
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The relationship between this rule directing courts to vote only
on logically independent issues and our overall goal of maximizing
guidance can also be illustrated with reference to what Rogers calls
the "co-occurrence likelihood"32 of issues. As Rogers notes, "if issues
are related in the sense that resolution of one affects the resolution of
the other"-in other words, if they are logically dependent----"it is
particularly likely that the issues will arise in the same case."33 The

converse is likely true as well: logically independent issues are likely
to be statistically independent as well, and will co-occur no more frequently than one would expect at random. Our issue decomposition
rule is consistent with Rogers's observation that "[i]f the co-occurrence
likelihood of two issues is high, then the problem of path dependence
for those two issues is small."34 To put the matter in our terms, to the

extent that two issues are logically (and thus statistically) dependent,
we would not expect incoherence to develop. There is therefore no
need to require courts to vote separately on logically dependent issues
in order to avoid incoherence, since incoherence will not develop in
any event.3 5
Constitution should be interpreted to avoid unfair results (issue G), disposition of the case also
requires determination of whether it is fair or unfair to deny Congress the power to give federal
courts jurisdiction over controversies between D.C. citizens and citizens of another state (issue
F). See Stearns, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1065 (cited in note 22) (noting that "many if not most of the
issues set out in [Rogers's] list [of Tidewater issues] are interesting questions for pedagogic
inquiry, but they are not 'issues' as lawyers and judges understand that term").
32. See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev.at 1018 (cited in note 6).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. We disagree with Rogers's suggestion, however, that incoherence will also disappear if
issues are logically independent. See id. at 1018-19. Even if the likelihood of co-occurrence is
quite low for any particular pair of issues, the incidence of incoherence can be significant in the
aggregate, given the large number of possible issue pairs. A simple model may help illustrate
this point. Assume we are trying to estimate the frequency with which path dependence might
manifest itself in a legal system. Suppose that:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

There are 1000 separate legal issues that can arise in any individual case, and
all issues are equiprobable and mutually independent. As a result, each issue
will arise with a probability of one in a thousand and the likelihood that a twoissue case will consist of any two particular issues (for example, issue #41 and
issue #738) is simply the product of their individual probabilities, or one in a
million (.001 x .001 = .000001).
All cases involve resolution of two separate issues.
All issues can be resolved in binary, yes-or-no, fashion. Each issue is equally
likely to be decided "yes" as it is "no" by any one judge.
In all cases, one side (whom we will call the plaintiff) wins only if a "yes" is
returned on both issues.
All cases are heard by three-member panels.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1082

[Vol. 49:1069

We can represent the results of all two-issue cases by means of a six-cell matrix (similar to
the matrix presented in Example I in the text).
..I-o

Issue I

Issue 2

YorN
YorN
YorN

YorN
YorN
YorN

There are 26 = 64 different matrices that can describe the results of the coures deliberations in
all cases. The paradoxical result will be produced in six of those.
Case 1.
Judee
A
B
C
Case 2.
Judge
A
B
C
Case 3.
Judee
A
B
C
Case 4.
Judee
A
B
C
Case 5.
Judge
A
B
C
Case 6.
Judge

Issue 1

Issue 2

Y
Y
N

Y
N
Y

Issue 1

Issue 2

Y
N
Y

Y
Y
N

Issue 1

Issue 2

Y
N
Y

N
Y
Y

Issue 1

Issue 2

N
Y
Y

Y
N
Y

Issue 1

Issue 2

N
Y
Y

Y
Y
N

Issue 1

Issue 2

In each of these cases, the court sides with the plaintiff under issue voting (since a "yes" is
returned on each of the two issues) but with the defendant under outcome voting (because 2 of
the three judges believe that defendant should prevail). Thus, in any given case, there are 64
possible (and equiprobable) voting distributions, six of which (approximately 9%) yield the
paradoxical result. We can therefore predict that, of our 1000 issues, 90 issues (9% of the total)
will first arise in the "paradoxical" case.
This model hardly captures the complexity of the real world. We put it forward simply to
demonstrate that even in situations where all pairwise combinations of issues have a low
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Our issue decomposition rule does not solve every aspect of
issue formulation. This issue decomposition rule will produce a
unique set of primary issues defined vertically. That is, it provides a
manageable "stopping rule" for the vertical issue decomposition
process. However, cases may present alternative primary issues at
any level of decomposition defined horizontally. For example, a judge
presented with the case in Example 1 may believe that the case
should be disposed of on grounds entirely unrelated to the
constitutional questions on which we (and Rogers) have focused. This
judge may believe that this case raises questions about two other
issues-say, jury bias and whether the defendant's trial counsel
afforded constitutionally adequate representation.
In a case where the judges disagree about the primary issues
defined horizontally, our decomposition rule will not be effective. In
these cases, it may be necessary to use a metavote procedure
analogous to the one recommended by Kornhauser and Sager to solve
the incoherence that this horizontal indeterminacy can produce. 36
This would entail a vote by the court on the particular issue
formulation the court should use in issue voting. This metavote
procedure may itself present a number of difficulties, the most serious
of which is that it may not yield any issues for the court to resolve.
For example, suppose that the three judges offer distinct and
mutually exclusive sets of primary issues (which we label X, Y, and
Z). Suppose they first consider whether issue set X describes the
primary issues in the case. This proposal will be defeated by a two-toone majority. Similarly, a two-to-one majority will defeat the proposal
that the court consider issue set Y, or issue set Z, as the primary
issues presented. 37 Thus, there is potential incoherence in an issue
voting system as well.
likelihood of co-occurrence (.0000001), path dependence and incoherence do not vanish. A nontrivial proportion of cases (9%) will arise in the paradoxical context.
36. See Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 30 (cited in note 3). Kornhauser and
Sager recommend the use of a metavote to resolve the question of whether to use outcome
voting or issue voting.
37. Alternatively, if the court chooses between issue statements using pairwise voting, the
Condorcet paradox may arise, along with the potential for agenda manipulation. For example,
suppose the three judges rank the appropriateness of the three sets of potential primary issues
as follows:

ABC

aid=

Rankin
X>Y>Z

DEF

Y>Z>X

GHI

Z>X>Y
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Of course, in this circumstance the outcome-voting solution is
also problematic. If the judges disagree among themselves about the
issues that need to be addressed in order to resolve the case, they can,
to be sure, reach a collective outcome, each judge on his or her own
terms. But the resulting opinions will have no precedential value at
all. Moreover, as we pointed out in our earlier article, outcome voting
suffers from incoherence, path dependence, and its own brand of
agenda manipulation.
V. CONCLUSION

There thus appears to be no perfect solution to the problems
identified by Professor Rogers. Both issue voting and outcome voting
have potential flaws. Overall, we retain a preference for the greater
guidance provided by issue voting. After all, appellate courts have expertise in formulating issues, and, we believe, providing guidance and
usable precedent is their primary responsibility. But a comprehensive justification for issue voting would require examination of
normative considerations other than those we have been discussing
3
here. 8
Our belief that the Guidance Objection to outcome voting is the
more serious problem intensified when the Supreme Court decided
39 during the
the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
preparation of this Reply. In Seminole Tribe, the Court overruled the
holding in Pennsylvaniav. Union Gas Co.40 that the Commerce Clause
grants Congress the power to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity. Union Gas itself well illustrates, as Kornhauser and Sager
put it, the "embarrassed state of current practice."'41 In Union Gas,
the Court was caught between the dominant outcome-voting
paradigm and the paradoxical result. A majority of justices believed
that Congress possesses the power to override the State of
Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity, and a majority believed that
Congress did so in the superfund statute; a majority of the Court,

Pairwise votes on the better formulation of the primary issues will yield the Condorcet paradox,
and will "cycle" endlessly, because X defeats Y (2-1), Y defeats Z (2-1), and Z defeats X (2-1).
38. See Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 3-10 (cited in note 3), for an extensive
discussion of the view that judicial decision making is a "collegial" enterprise and the
significance of that view for the issue-voting/outcome-voting debate.
39.
40.

116 S. Ct. 114 (1996).
491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989).

41.

Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 18 (cited in note 3).
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however, also favored the outcome that the State of Pennsylvania
42
could not be sued under the superfund statute.
The issue-voting solution to this paradox would have been
straightforward: Pennsylvania loses (and two clear precedents are established). But in Union Gas, while the Court indeed reached this
outcome (that is, Pennsylvania lost), the precedents were not at all
clear because the Court reached this outcome only by the expedient of
Justice White's "switching" his vote away from his preferred
outcome. 43 Not surprisingly, from out of this somewhat chaotic
situation and the absence of any agreement about what the Court was
actually doing in Union Gas, incoherence quickly resulted. As the
Court noted in Seminole Tribe:
The Court in Union Gas reached a result without an expressed rationale
agreed upon by a majority of the Court....
In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proven to be a solitary departure from established law. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer
Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 US 139, 113 S. Ct. 684, 121 L. Ed. 2d
605 (1993).... The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable
precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed
with the rationale of the plurality. See Nichols v. United States, 511 US 114 S.
Ct. 1921, 1927, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994) (the "degree of confusion following a
splintered decision. . . is itself a reason for reexamining that decision").44

Union Gas has indeed proven deficient in the guidance it provided, precisely because the Court inadequately addressed these voting protocol questions. We believe that the better solution would have
been for the Court to bite the bullet and explicitly adopt the issue-voting procedure.

42. See Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 751-52 (cited in note 2); Kornhauser and
Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 18-20 (cited in note 3).
43. See Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 752 (cited in note 2) ("[B]y voting to affirm
the court of appeals, Justice White allowed the Court to preserve the outward appearance of
outcome-voting," while "[u]nder true issue-voting... no individual Justice would be compelled,
as Justice White was, to switch his vote to take his colleagues' view on the constituent issues
into account"); Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 18-20 (cited in note 3) (noting that in
Union Gas Justice White appears to accept the principle of issue voting while none of his
colleagues did so).

44.

Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1127-28.

